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INTRODUCTION
You are reading a student note—for better or worse—so you are
likely familiar with the concept of litigation.  You probably are also
familiar with the idea that litigation is expensive.  Although
statutorily-imposed costs of federal civil litigation are relatively small,1
† B.S., Cornell University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2015; Articles
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 100.  Thank you to my family for its enduring love and
support and to Cornell for seven amazing years (excluding the winters).
1 The filing fee for a federal lawsuit is a relatively low $350 regardless of the contro-
versy’s size. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2012).  Further, courts can even waive a filing fee if an
individual cannot afford it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2012).
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actual litigation costs tend to be much larger.2  Undoubtedly, litiga-
tion costs affect an individual’s decision-making process at every stage,
including whether to sue in the first instance, settle an ongoing dis-
pute, or appeal a negative decision.3
Suppose that you are one of the many fine Americans that enjoy
numismatics—the study or collection of coins.4  Suppose further that
you purchase what you believe to be genuine coins, but, unhappily,
these coins turn out to be unmarked replicas.  You now have a legal
cause of action against the manufacturer under the Hobby Protection
Act because the manufacturer failed to mark the coins as replicas.5
Although litigation costs are substantial, your attorney assures you that
you have a fairly strong case and informs you that, if you win, the
manufacturer will pay your attorney fees under the Hobby Protection
Act.6
Although you could sue the manufacturer, there are several alter-
native courses of action available to you.  You could, as most people
do, simply accept this harm and move on.7  You could privately negoti-
ate a settlement or engage in alternative dispute resolution with the
manufacturer.8  Suppose that, relying on your attorney’s representa-
tion that the manufacturer will cover your attorney fees should you
win, you decide to sue the manufacturer.9
2 Estimates place the cost of litigation somewhere between $15,000 and $20,000 in
cases involving discovery. See Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of
Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010) (“[W]e found median litigation
costs, including attorneys’ fees, of $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.”).
This, however, does not include nonpecuniary costs, such as time and psychological stress,
which may be substantial. See id.
3 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
1166 (2001) (“The central concerns [of bringing suit] are the costs to potential parties of
their actions . . . and the effects of their behavior on other individuals . . . .”); James R.
Maxeiner, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 212 (2010)
(“Wise American lawyers advise against giving any prediction of what likely expenses will be
on both sides.  It is not rare for expenses to exceed the amount in controversy.”); MARIE
GRYPHON, GREATER JUSTICE, LOWER COST: HOW A “LOSER PAYS” RULE WOULD IMPROVE THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, MANHATTAN INST. CIV. JUSTICE REP. NO. 11, at 2 (2008) (“For
small businesses, . . . litigation, and especially its associated legal fees, is a shock that can
make it suddenly impossible for them to meet their ongoing financial obligations.”).
4 Numismatics, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/numismat-
ics (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
5 See Hobby Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2101(b), 2102 (2012).
6 Although the traditional American rule on legal fees requires that each side pay his
or her legal costs, the Hobby Protection Act allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasona-
ble attorney fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 2102.
7 See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1951
(2009) (“[M]ost disputes do not even become lawsuits in the first place.  Injured persons
abandon or settle the overwhelming majority of grievances at some point along the line.”).
8 See id. at 1951–52 (creating a “grievance pyramid” chart for private negotiation or
settlement possibilities prior to litigation).
9 Suing would not be an altogether unusual result, however, as there were 278,442
case filings in 2012 alone. See 2012 Annual Report of the Director on Judicial Business of the
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If you win at trial, you will be entitled to your damages and the
costs of the suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees because the
Hobby Protection Act is a fee-shifting statute.10  If nothing else occurs,
you can enforce your judgment after fourteen days and go home to
enjoy your numismatic menagerie.11  However, the manufacturer is
entitled to make several post-verdict motions at this point, including
motions for judgment as a matter of law,12 a new trial,13 or relief from
the judgment.14  Each of these would entail further delay for you.  Re-
gardless of whether the manufacturer makes any of the above mo-
tions, the manufacturer has the right to appeal the adverse decision.15
Although the manufacturer has the right to appeal—and this right is
basically sacrosanct16—only about 20% of losing parties actually ap-
peal an adverse ruling,17 so you may be on your way home.
Assume, however, that the manufacturer does decide to appeal.
To initiate the appeal, the manufacturer must simply file a notice of
appeal with the district clerk within thirty days after the district court
enters judgment.18  The court may also require the manufacturer to
pay a modest filing fee of $500, regardless of the extent of your al-
leged damages.19  After such considerable delay, you may be asking
yourself how the court plans to protect you and ensure the money is
United States Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/judicialbusiness/
2012.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).  Although you have sued, it is not certain that the
court will reach a final determination in your case, as settlement or abandonment of the
claim is still available. See Clermont, supra note 7, at 1951 (noting possible settlement op- R
tions once litigation commences on grievance pyramid chart).
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 2102.  Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that the district
courts might award costs and attorney fees prior to final disposition at the district court
level. See Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974) (“A district court must
have discretion to award fees and costs incident to the final disposition of interim
matters.”).
11 See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a).
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a).
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
16 The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a party’s failure to take any
step other than timely filing the notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal.
See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(2).
17 See Clermont, supra note 7, at 1971 n.242 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore R
Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 123,
130–31 (2001)).
18 See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1), 4(a)(1).
19 See JAMES R. MAXEINER ET AL., FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 224 (2011) (“Filing fees for appeals from the United States District
Court to the Court of Appeals are modest: In 2010 the charge was $450 without regard to
the amount in controversy.”).  The filing fee as of December 1, 2014 is $500. See Court of
Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/formsandfees/
fees/courtofappealsmiscellaneousfeeschedule.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
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available for recovery.  After all, not only did you win the trial, but you
are also overwhelmingly likely to win on appeal.20
The federal civil litigation system protects your judgment during
your opponent’s appeal in several ways.  First, unless the manufacturer
makes any other motions, you may still enforce your judgment during
the appeal.21  The court further protects your judgment by requiring
the manufacturer to post a supersedeas bond in order to stay enforce-
ment—a bond that must be large enough to cover the entire judg-
ment.22  The court may also require the manufacturer to post some
other kind of security, in lieu of a supersedeas bond, to protect your
ability to collect on your judgment.23  These mechanisms substantially
protect your judgment and right to collect attorney fees under the
Hobby Protection Act, but what about your costs, including attorney
fees, incurred in defending the manufacturer’s appeal?
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) protect you
from several increased expenses going forward.24  FRAP 7 is one such
protection mechanism.  Under FRAP 7, the district court may require
an appellant—here, the coin manufacturer—to file a bond to ensure
payment of your “costs on appeal.”25  FRAP 39(e) defines “costs” as
the costs of preparation and transmission of the record and transcript,
20 See Clermont, supra note 7, at 1970–72 (finding that appellate courts agree with R
district courts in nearly 80% of cases).
21 See Fong v. United States, 300 F.2d 400, 410 (9th Cir. 1962) (“[P]endency of an
appeal of itself [does not] supersede[ ] the judgment.”).  Although no rule explicitly states
this proposition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 contemplates that the appellant must
take some action in order to stay the enforcement of the judgment in addition to appeal-
ing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a), (d).
22 See FED R. CIV. P. 62(d); MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURIS-
DICTION AND PRACTICE 373 (3d ed. 1999) (“If a party is appealing from a money judgment,
and posts a supersedeas bond that fully secures the judgment creditor, Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d)
has been held to provide that it is entitled to stay of execution on the judgment pending
appeal.”).  Some authority suggests that the court may stay enforcement of the judgment
regardless of whether the appellant posts a supersedeas bond. See Olympia Equip. Leasing
Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that “an inflexible
requirement of a bond would be inappropriate in two sorts of case[s]”).  It should be made
clear, however, that failing to post the supersedeas bond in no way affects the manufac-
turer’s ability to proceed with the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(2) (“An appellant’s
failure to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal . . . .”); TIGAR & TIGAR, supra, at 375 (“If a party ordered to post a
supersedeas bond does not do so, its appeal may still proceed.  It simply lacks protection
against execution on the judgment pending appeal.”).
23 See Olympia Equip. Leasing, 786 F.2d at 795–96 (allowing alternative security for a
$36 million judgment in the form of a pledge of $10 million cash, $10 million in accounts
receivable, and a security interest in physical assets).
24 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 7 (requiring bond for costs on appeal in a civil case); FED. R.
APP. P. 37 (providing that interest be charged against the appellant on the district court
judgment); FED. R. APP. P. 38 (providing for damages and single or double costs if the
court of appeals determines the appeal is frivolous); FED. R. APP. P. 39 (defining costs on
appeal).
25 See FED. R. APP. P. 7.
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premiums paid for bonds, and the fee for filing the notice of appeal.26
Appellate attorney fees, which may be considerably expensive for an
individual numismatist like yourself, are conspicuously absent from
FRAP 39’s definition of costs.  Consider these bonds to cover costs on
appeal from some seminal cases: $7,250,27 $10,000,28 $25,000,29
$35,000,30 $40,000,31 $50,000,32 and $180,000.33  Conceivably, FRAP 7
and 39 leave you to defend the coin manufacturer’s appeal without
assurance that the coin manufacturer can reimburse these significant
appellate attorney fees.  Having relied on the Hobby Protection Act’s
fee-shifting provision when deciding to sue, would this uncertainty
about your appellate attorney fees make you less likely to bring your
meritorious claim in the first instance?  Knowing that the FRAP 7
bond would not include your significant appellate attorney fees,
would the coin manufacturer be more likely to appeal and delay your
recovery?  These considerations reveal that litigants need and want to
know whether an FRAP 7 bond may include appellate attorney fees.
Unfortunately, the federal circuits disagree on whether FRAP 7
appellate bonds may include expected appellate attorney fees.  The
D.C. and Third Circuits suggest that FRAP 7 bonds do not include
appellate attorney fees, so you would face the risk that the coin manu-
facturer could not reimburse you in these circuits.  The First, Second,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits suggest that FRAP 7 bonds can
include appellate attorney fees in some circumstances, particularly
when the litigation involves a fee-shifting statute like the Hobby Pro-
tection Act.34  The circuits, however, are not alone in creating uncer-
tainty for you regarding your appellate attorney fees.
The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (Committee) has
also taken conflicting stances regarding FRAP 7.  In 2003, the
Committee recommended an amendment to the rules to make clear
26 See FED. R. APP. P. 39(e).
27 See Hirschensohn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. 96–7312, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
13793, at *3 (3d Cir. June 10, 1997) ($7,250 bond “included the defendants’ estimate of
attorneys’ fees in prosecuting the appeal”).
28 In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 715–16 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that
$10,000 bond must be reduced to $450 to reflect actual costs without estimated attorney
fees).
29 Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420 F. App’x 6, 16 (1st Cir. 2011).
30 See Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) ($35,000 bond intended to cover
“costs and attorney’s fees upon appeal”).
31 Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2007).
32 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2004).
33 See Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2002)
($180,000 bond for six appellants included “approximately $29,000 per appellant in antici-
pated attorneys’ fees”).
34 See Int’l Floor Crafts, 420 F. App’x at 17 (holding that “a Rule 7 bond may include
appellate attorneys’ fees if the applicable statute underlying the litigation contains a
fee-shifting provision” and citing support from the “Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits”).
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that FRAP 7 “costs on appeal” do not include appellate attorney fees.35
In 2007, the Committee “decided that the proposed amendment war-
rant[ed] further review” based on the circuit split regarding FRAP 7.36
Although the Committee recommended further empirical research to
aid its decision making,37 it has not addressed FRAP 7 and its relation
to appellate attorney fees since.
In this Note, I first provide some background information about
this issue.  I discuss data regarding the frequency with which courts of
appeals affirm district court decisions.  I then review the history and
purpose of FRAP 7.  Next, I discuss the history and purpose of Ameri-
can fee-shifting statutes, which are exceptions to the traditional
“American rule” on legal costs.  Understanding some background on
each of these three aspects of civil litigation sheds light on FRAP 7’s
importance.
I then evaluate the circuit split regarding whether FRAP 7 bonds
may include appellate attorney fees.  I argue against the Advisory
Committee and D.C. and Third Circuits’ conclusion that FRAP 7
bonds do not include appellate attorney fees because FRAP 39’s defi-
nition of “costs” does not include attorney fees.  Instead, I contend
that the First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits reached a
partially correct result.  These courts hold that FRAP 7 bonds may in-
clude attorney fees if the underlying statute provides for fee-shifting
but need not include such fees.
Finally, I conclude that the high rate of affirmance on appeal, the
purpose of FRAP 7, and the purpose of fee-shifting statutes dictate
that FRAP 7 appellate bonds should always include attorney fees when
the underlying statute provides for fee-shifting.
I
APPEALS GENERALLY: A HIGH RATE OF AFFIRMANCE
One cannot appreciate FRAP 7’s practical importance without
understanding its place in the overall context of appeals.  The United
States Courts of Appeals have mandatory jurisdiction over final deci-
sions of the United States District Courts38 and have mixed mandatory
and discretionary jurisdiction over some interlocutory decisions of the
35 See Memorandum from Hon. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appel-
late Rules, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure 2 (Dec. 2, 2003).  Because of the Committee’s practice of “‘bundling’ proposed
amendments,” the Committee did not submit the amendment for approval by the Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. See Memorandum from Hon. Carl E.
Stewart, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair,
Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 5–6 (Dec. 12, 2007).
36 See Memorandum from Hon. Carl E. Stewart, supra note 35, at 5–6.
37 See id.
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
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United States District Courts.39  For civil cases alone, the courts of ap-
peals received over 30,000 appeals in 2012.40  Of these 30,000 cases,
over 12,000 involved only private litigants—like the numismatist de-
scribed above.41
On appeal, the courts of appeals use a variety of standards to re-
view a district court’s decision.42  The standard of review determines
“how certain the appellate court must be of error by the trial judge in
order to overturn the original decision.”43 Although many varieties
exist, courts of appeals generally apply one of three different stan-
dards: de novo, clear error, or abuse of discretion.44
Courts of appeals review pure issues of law de novo, meaning that
an appellate court will overturn a district court simply if the appellate
court disagrees with the district court’s conclusion.45  Courts of ap-
peals review judge-found facts for clear error, meaning that an appel-
late court will overturn a district court if the appellate court has “the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”46
Finally, courts of appeals review some decisions for abuse of discre-
tion, meaning the court of appeals will only overturn a district court if
there is “almost-certain error.”47  De novo review requires less cer-
tainty than clear-error review, which, in turn, requires less certainty
than abuse of discretion review to allow a court of appeals to overturn
a district court’s decision.  Accordingly, one would probably expect
the courts of appeals to overturn district court decisions more
frequently when applying less deferential standards of review—like de
39 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012).  Section 1292(a) creates mandatory jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders regarding injunctions and receiverships. See id. Section 1292(b) cre-
ates discretionary jurisdiction over questions essentially certified by the district court judge.
See id. This Note focuses solely on civil litigation appeals from district courts.  In addition,
the courts of appeals hear appeals from bankruptcy courts and administrative agencies.  See
Table 2 U.S. Courts of Appeals Sources of Appeals Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/judicialbusiness/2012/us-courts-of-appeals.aspx (last
visited Mar. 23, 2015) (“Seventy-seven percent of filings [in U.S. courts of appeals] were
appeals of decisions by the district courts, and 15 percent were appeals of decisions by
administrative agencies.  Seven percent were original proceedings, and 1 percent were ap-
peals of bankruptcy case decisions.”).  Further, this Note does not address appeals to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears appeals involving customs, pat-
ents, veterans claims, and some federal administrative boards. See U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/
us-courts-of-appeals.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
40 See Table 2 U.S. Courts of Appeals Sources of Appeals Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, supra
note 39.
41 See id.
42 See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGI-
CAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD 42–45 (2013).
43 Id. at 42.
44 See id. at 42–43.
45 See id. at 43.
46 Id. at 44 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
47 Id. at 44.
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novo—than when applying more deferential standards like abuse of
discretion.  This, however, has not traditionally been the case.
Although courts of appeals apply varying standards on review, re-
search suggests that the courts of appeals affirm almost 80% of trial
court decisions.48  The high rate of affirmance on appeal suggests that
appellate review undermines efficiency, increases costs,49 and is not
essential to dispute resolution in civil litigation.50  Further, the “futility
of appeal”51 in civil litigation creates opportunities for wealthy appel-
lants—like the coin manufacturer above—to forestall an appellee of
modest means—like the numismatist above—from recovering on a
judgment.52  In fact, some scholars point to these pitfalls to argue that
appellants should face a higher cost on appeal, thereby reducing the
overall number of appeals.53  Accordingly, FRAP 7 may play an impor-
tant role in increasing an appellant’s cost of appeals and protecting
appellees that must defend appeals.
II
HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF FRAP 7
A. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Seven:
Bond for Costs on Appeal in a Civil Case
Congress adopted Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 7
on July 1, 1968.54  The Advisory Committee notes state that the
48 See FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 97 (1994)
(“Usually around 80 percent (plus or minus several points) of civil appeals . . . are unsuc-
cessful, with most decisions being unanimous.”); Clermont, supra note 7, at 1970–72.  The R
high rate of affirmance may be attributed to deferential review, but research further sug-
gests that even de novo review yields high affirmance rates because experts frequently tend
to agree. See id. at 1970–71 (“One may even expect a high affirmance rate when review is
de novo, because of the tendency of experts to agree at about a 75% rate.”).
49 See MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 19, at 226 (stating that the appellate system “is a R
system from which only lawyers profit”).
50 See id. at 208 (“Although appeals are of intense interest to losing parties, they are
not essential to dispute resolution.  Indeed, were dispute resolution the only goal of civil
justice systems, appeals might be dispensed with.”).  However, Maxeiner recognizes that
appellate review benefits the judicial system in several, important ways. See id.
51 See Chris Guthrie & Tracy E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into
the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 357
(2005).
52 See MAXEINER ET AL., supra note 19, at 224 (“In the United States where legal aid is R
not generally available, appeals provide opportunity for wealthy parties to prevent poor
parties from ever succeeding to rights found in first instance.”).
53 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
379, 421 (1995) (recognizing that fees on appeal are low and unlikely to deter pointless
appeals).
54 For background see, Report, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (September 1967), at 30, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/reports/ST09-1967.pdf [hereinafter
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Report]; see also Current Rules of Practice &
Procedure, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/current-
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Committee derived FRAP 7 “from FRCP 73(c) without change in sub-
stance.”55  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 73(c) required an
appellant to post a $250 bond unless the court fixed another amount
or the appellant had already posted a supersedeas bond or other se-
curity that covered potential costs on appeal.56  FRAP 7 adopted FRCP
73(c)’s language largely without change.57
On their face, both FRCP 73(c) and FRAP 7 seem to suggest that
appellate bonds play a limited role in protecting appellees from bur-
densome costs moving forward.  For example, even in 1968, $250 was
likely not a substantial amount in relation to total litigation costs.
Also, both rules provided that when an appellant posted a supersedeas
bond or other security covering costs on appeal, further security
would not be necessary.  However, other aspects of the rules’ lan-
rules.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).  Congress’s approval came after the Supreme Court
approved the rules in 1967. See id.
55 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Report, supra note 54, at 31.
56 When Congress adopted FRAP 7, thereby replacing FRCP 73(c), FRCP 73(c) read:
(c) BOND ON APPEAL.  Unless an appellant is exempted by law, or has filed
a supersedeas bond or other undertaking which includes security for the payment of
costs on appeal, he shall file a bond for such costs or deposit equivalent secur-
ity therefor with the notice of appeal, but security shall not be required of
an appellant who is not subject to costs.  The bond or equivalent security
shall be in the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, unless the court fixes a
different amount.  The bond on appeal shall have sufficient surety and shall
be conditioned to secure the payment of costs if the appeal is dismissed or
the judgment affirmed, or of such costs as the court of appeals may award if
the judgment is modified.  If a bond on appeal or equivalent security in the
sum of two hundred and fifty dollars is given, no approval thereof is neces-
sary.  After a bond on appeal is filed an appellee may raise objections to the
form of the bond or to the sufficiency of the surety for determination by
the clerk.
See Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 84 (June 10, 1965),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/reports/CV08-
1965.pdf (emphasis added).
57 Original FRAP 7 read:
Rule 7. BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES.  Unless an ap-
pellant is exempted by law, or has filed a supersedeas bond or other undertaking
which includes security for the payment of costs on appeal, in civil cases a bond for
costs on appeal or equivalent security shall be filed by the appellant in the
district court with the notice of appeal; but security shall not be required of
an appellant who is not subject to costs. The bond or equivalent security shall be
in the sum or value of $250 unless the district court fixes a different amount. A
bond for costs on appeal shall have sufficient surety, and it or any
equivalent security shall be conditioned to secure the payment of costs if
the appeal is finally dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of such costs as
the court of appeals may direct if the judgment is modified. If a bond or
equivalent security in the sum or value of $250 is given, no approval thereof
is necessary.  After a bond for costs on appeal is filed, an appellee may raise
for determination by the clerk of the district court objections to the form of
the bond or to the sufficiency of the surety. The provisions of Rule 8(b)
apply to a surety upon a bond given pursuant to this rule.
See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Report, supra note 54, at 30 (emphasis
added).
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guage, subsequent amendments, Advisory Committee notes, and
Supreme Court precedent suggest that FRAP 7 appellate bonds play a
more expansive, pro-appellee role.
Although FRAP 7 and FRCP 73(c) only required an initial bond
of $250, both rules contemplated discretion to alter the amount.58
The original language in both rules leaves open the possibility that the
court might increase the bond amount to further protect an appellee
on appeal.
Subsequent amendments to FRAP 7 further suggest that a
broader, pro-appellee reading of “costs on appeal” is appropriate.  In
1979, the Judicial Conference removed the initial requirement for a
$250 bond because it bore “no relationship to actual costs.”59  The
Advisory Committee notes to this amendment read:
The amendment would eliminate the provision of the present rule
that requires the appellant to file a $250 bond for costs on appeal at
the time of filing his notice of appeal. The $250 provision was car-
ried forward in the F.R.App.P. from former Rule 73(c) of the
F.R.Civ.P., and the $250 figure has remained unchanged since the
adoption of that rule in 1937. Today it bears no relationship to actual
costs. The amended rule would leave the question of the need for a
bond for costs and its amount in the discretion of the court.60
Importantly, this amendment acknowledged that $250 did not accu-
rately reflect the growing costs to an appellee of defending an appeal.
Also, the amendment again acknowledged that courts retain discre-
tion in fixing the bond’s amount to protect an appellee.  Ultimately,
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure unani-
mously adopted the amendment in its entirety.61
Additionally, the Advisory Committee notes to FRCP 73(c) sug-
gest that an appellant who had posted a supersedeas bond might
avoid further appellate bonds in limited circumstances.62  Specifically,
the Advisory Committee contemplated that appellants in admiralty
cases frequently posted security for the total cost of litigation early in
58 FRCP 73(c) required $250 “unless the court fixe[d] a different amount.” See State-
ment on Behalf of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 56, at 84.  Similarly,
FRAP 7 required $250 “unless the district court fixe[d] a different amount.” See Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Report, supra note 54, at 30.
59 See FED R. APP. P. 7 advisory committee’s note.
60 Id. (emphasis added).
61 See Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1–2
(September 1978), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/
reports/ST09-1978.pdf (making only “technical and clarifying changes” to the proposed
amendment before being “unanimously approved by the Standing Committee”).
62 See Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 88 (June 10,
1965), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/reports/
CV08-1965.pdf.
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proceedings.63  By enumerating a specific subset of litigation, the Ad-
visory Committee seems to contemplate a narrow reading for this as-
pect of FRCP 73(c) and, by extension, FRAP 7.  Further, reading this
language narrowly is appropriate because a party providing such se-
curity for the total cost of litigation would seem to be the exception,
rather than the rule, in civil litigation.64
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent, like Bradley v. Richmond
School Board, suggests that courts should err on the side of protecting
victorious parties.65  In Bradley, the Court indicated that a district
court might award costs even prior to final determination at the trial
level.66  The Court stated, “[t]o delay a fee award until the entire litiga-
tion is concluded would work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and
their counsel . . . .”67  The Court contemplated that district courts
might protect a party likely to prevail by providing costs upon the “en-
try of any order that determines substantial rights of the parties.”68  If
an interim order in the district court “determines substantial rights”
entitling a litigant to prejudgment costs,69 a litigant who prevails on
the merits in the district court would seem to be entitled to similarly
favorable protection pending appeal.  Given the Supreme Court’s
pro-prevailing-party approach in Bradley, which simply relies on an “or-
der that determines substantial rights of the parties,”70 courts should
read FRAP 7 broadly in favor of appellees who have already won their
case on the merits.
B. Fee-Shifting in American Litigation
As early as 1278, English courts of equity provided that victorious
plaintiffs could recover their attorney fees.71  By 1607, English courts
allowed victorious defendants to recover attorney fees in some cases,
63 See id. The Advisory Committee’s note to FRCP 73(c) stated:
Subdivision (c).  The additions to the first sentence permit the deposit of
security other than a bond and eliminate the requirement of security in
cases in which the appellant has already given security covering the total
cost of litigation at an earlier stage in the proceeding (a common occur-
rence in admiralty cases) . . . .
Id.
64 See infra Part II.B (discussing fee-shifting in American civil litigation).
65 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974).
66 See id.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 723 n.28.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (1993) (“In 1278, the Statutes of Gloucester
allowed only the victorious plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees in specified actions.”).
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such as trespass and contract.72  Today, English courts systematically
provide that the losing party must pay for the winning party’s legal
costs, including attorney fees.73  Commentators frequently refer to
this “loser-pays” practice as the “English rule.”74
In 1796, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the
“American rule,” which provides that a prevailing party in a lawsuit
generally may not recover its attorney fees from the losing side.75
Later courts embraced the American rule more explicitly, stating, “in
the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to
collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”76
Arguments for and against both the English and American rules
abound.77  David A. Root summarizes the critiques of both rules with
two competing anecdotes in his article on attorney fee-shifting:
The headline in the New York Times read, “You Win but You
Lose,” as the author lamented about the money he had to pay out in
successfully defending himself in a libel suit.  While the amount was
only $5,134.80 (small fees in comparison to many lawsuits), the fact
that frivolous lawsuits could be pursued by hasty plaintiffs without
the threat of having to pay a successful defendant’s legal costs in-
flamed the author as he was bitten by the “American rule.”  Like
him, other commentators and judicial experts have clamored for
72 See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 853 (1929) (“In 1607 the final step
was taken when it was provided that a defendant might recover costs in all cases in which
the plaintiff would have had them if he had recovered.”).
73 See Vargo, supra note 71, at 1571. R
74 See Maxeiner, supra note 3, at 197–98. R
75 See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796) (denying the prevailing party a
recovery of $1600 because “[t]he general practice of the United States [was] in opposition
to it”) .
76 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
77 See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967) (stating that the American rule avoids unfairly allocating the uncertainty of litiga-
tion costs); Rodulfa v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D.D.C. 1969) (recognizing that
the American rule might not make a prevailing party whole); W. Kent Davis, The Interna-
tional View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How It
Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 430–32 (1999) (arguing that the English
rule would reduce overall litigation and improve attorneys’ reputations but recognizing
that the English rule might reduce some meritorious claims); James W. Hughes & Edward
A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence,
38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 249 (1995) (discussing the English rule’s potential to reduce non-
meritorious claims but recognizing that the American rule may improve precedent devel-
opment); Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys’ Fees in Civil
Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 357, 386–87 (2011) (acknowledging that the American
rule increases access to courts for parties with limited financial resources but also increases
frivolous litigation and distrust between attorneys and clients); David A. Root, Attorney Fee-
Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English
Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 616–17 (2005) (arguing that the American rule
increases access to courts but ultimately concluding that American jurisprudence should
adopt a combination of the American and English rules).
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the adoption of the English “loser pays” rule in many areas of the
law, hoping to decrease frivolous and unreasonable litigation.
However, it is not all a bed of roses on the other side of the
Atlantic. In London, England, Pauline Hughes brought an action
against the treating physicians following her late husband’s death
caused by his gall bladder surgery.  After an initial victory in the trial
court and an award of $396,000, the appellate court overturned
Mrs. Hughes’ victory and, in accordance with the “loser pays” rule,
ordered her to pay the successful doctors’ litigation expenses.
These expenses totaled $144,000, on top of her own legal fees of
$146,000, thus totaling $290,000 in an attempt to sort out and make
right the tragic events befallen her deceased husband.78
Generally, proponents of the American rule argue that the American
rule increases access to courts,79 avoids penalizing parties for the un-
certainty of litigation,80 avoids the difficult question and expense of
determining legal fees,81 increases the promulgation of novel legal
theories and valuable precedent,82 and encourages settlement where
legal fees exceed potential recovery.83  Concurrently, proponents of
the English rule argue that the English rule more fully compensates
victorious plaintiffs and protects innocent defendants,84 deters frivo-
lous claims by increasing potential costs to plaintiffs,85 potentially in-
creases settlements,86 and increases the amount of meritorious claims
where legal fees may exceed recovery.87  Although the American and
English rules both provide certain benefits, they both have certain
drawbacks.
Opponents of the English rule generally contend that the English
rule deters reasonable claims that are not clear winners,88 potentially
decreases settlements because litigants have positive bias favoring the
merits of their own case,89 and potentially threatens development of
78 Root, supra note 77, at 583 (citation omitted). R
79 See id. at 616.
80 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718.
81 See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL
COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 62 (2008). While this is a potential benefit of the American
rule, Cohen notes that Congress has indeed passed several statutes defining “reasonable
attorney’s fees.” See id.
82 See Hughes & Snyder, supra note 77, at 249. R
83 See Root, supra note 77, at 609 (“[U]nder the ‘American rule,’ if both parties are R
certain of victory, they will still settle in cases where the cost of victory at trial is more than
the cost of settling . . . .”).
84 See id. at 604.
85 See id.
86 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Adminis-
tration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 428–29 (1973).
87 See COHEN, supra note 81, at 61. R
88 See Root, supra note 77, at 607–08. R
89 See id. at 609–10.
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law based on litigants arguing novel legal theories.90  On the other
hand, opponents of the American rule argue that the American rule
increases court congestion,91 fails to make winning parties whole,92
and reduces the amount of meritorious claims where legal fees may
exceed the plaintiff’s expected recovery.93
Due to these potential drawbacks, both the English and American
rules have several exceptions.94  The English rule has three primary
exceptions: certain courts do not tax costs to the losing parties; liti-
gants that receive “Legal Aid” do not bear the costs of privately funded
opponents; and parties bear their own costs when the amount in dis-
pute does not exceed a specific sum.95  The American rule has six
exceptions: contractual agreements, the “common fund” doctrine,96
the “substantial benefit” doctrine,97 contempt sanctions, bad faith
sanctions, and fee-shifting statutes.98  Fee-shifting statutes—like the
Hobby Protection Act described above—present the most salient ex-
ception to the traditional American rule, as Congress has passed more
than 200 federal fee-shifting statutes.99
C. Fee-Shifting Statutes
Fee-shifting statutes generally come in one of two varieties:
two-way and one-way.  Two-way fee-shifting statutes operate much like
the English rule and require the losing party to pay the prevailing
party’s legal costs.100  One-way fee-shifting statutes allow only one, spe-
cific party to recover its legal costs in the event that party prevails.101
Although the schemes operate differently, Congress creates both
90 See COHEN, supra note 81, at 62. R
91 See Vargo, supra note 71, at 1591. R
92 See Howard Greenberger, The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, an English Solution,
9 VILL. L. REV. 400, 414 (1964).
93 See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 CAL. ST. B.J. 107, 107
(1951); McLennan, supra note 77, at 357; Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 717, 720–21 (2010).
94 See Root, supra note 77, at 585–92 (“Like the ‘American rule,’ exceptions to the R
‘loser pays’ rule have also surfaced in recent years.” (citation omitted)).
95 See id.
96 The “common fund” doctrine allows a court to spread attorney fees across a
benefitted group on behalf of litigants “who create or preserve a common fund for the
benefit of others.” Vargo, supra note 71, at 1579. R
97 The “substantial benefit” doctrine operates similarly to the “common fund” doc-
trine, but incorporates pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary benefits. See id. at 1581–83;
Root, supra note 77, at 587. R
98 See Vargo, supra note 71, at 1578–90 (discussing the six exceptions to the American R
rule).
99 See Root, supra note 77, at 588; Vargo, supra note 71, at 1588.  In addition, there are R
close to 2000 fee-shifting statutes at the state level. See id.
100 See Vargo, supra note 71, at 1590.  The vast majority of fee-shifting statutes, however, R
are not two-way fee-shifting statutes. See id.
101 See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2040–41
(1993).
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two-way and one-way fee-shifting statutes to vindicate important
interests.
Two-way fee-shifting statutes include statutes like Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964102 and the Copyright Act,103 which allow ei-
ther side to recover their attorney fees in the event they prevail.  Such
two-way fee-shifting statutes serve dual purposes.  First, the statutes—
when rewarding plaintiffs—encourage plaintiffs to bring meritorious
claims.104  Congress may better preserve enforcement resources by al-
lowing private citizens to bring these suits, so Congress wants to en-
courage such suits.  Second, when rewarding attorney fees to
defendants, the statutes protect defendants from appeals that are
likely frivolous and time-consuming.105
The vast majority of Congress’s fee-shifting statutes are one-way
and favor plaintiffs.106  In actions against the federal government, stat-
utes like the Equal Access to Justice Act,107 the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act,108 and the Privacy Act109 provide that a prevailing plaintiff
may recover its legal costs, including reasonable attorney fees.  In ac-
tions against other private litigants, statutes like the Truth in Lending
Act110 and Section 4 of the Clayton Act111 provide that a prevailing
plaintiff may recover its legal costs, including reasonable attorney fees.
One-way fee-shifting statutes may shift fees automatically112 or only af-
ter a showing that the losing party is at fault.113  Although some criti-
cize one-way fee-shifting,114 one-way fee-shifting does provide benefits
and may offer a useful compromise between the English and Ameri-
can rules addressing some shortcomings of the American rule.
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (2012).  Title VII provides, “[i]n any action or proceeding
under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs . . . .” Id.
103 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).  The Copyright Act “does not distinguish on its face be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants.” COHEN, supra note 81, at 14.
104 See Vargo, supra note 71, at 1629. R
105 See Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
106 Vargo, supra note 71, at 1590. R
107 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012).
108 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2012).
109 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B) (2012).
110 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2012).
111 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
112 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring that the plaintiff recover at-
torney fees if the government cannot prove that its position was “substantially justified”).
113 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (2012) (allowing payment of reasonable attorney
fees to the “prevailing party”).
114 See Krent, supra note 101, at 2045 (stating that one-way fee shifting may over-deter R
legitimate activity by federal agencies and private corporations and be costly to adminis-
ter); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 9–11, 25 (1991) (urging abandonment of one-way fee shifting because it “may
well increase the likelihood of frivolous litigation”).
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For example, one-way fee-shifting statutes reduce Congress’s
monitoring costs by allowing private parties to police government and
private conduct.115  Curing a potential defect in the American rule,
Congress uses one-way fee-shifting statutes to increase a private plain-
tiff’s incentive to bring meritorious claims that do not promise large
recovery.116  Similar to the English rule, one-way fee-shifting makes
complete compensation for prevailing plaintiffs more likely, as the
prevailing plaintiff would recover its judgment and avoid liability for
legal costs like attorney fees.117 Additionally, one-way fee-shifting stat-
utes may serve to deter wrongful conduct by government agencies and
private entities prior to litigation,118 as well as deter frivolous ap-
peals.119  Finally, one-way fee-shifting statutes may provide a useful
tool to increase access to courts for parties of modest means.120
BACKGROUND SUMMARY
The high level of affirmance on appeal, the history of FRAP 7,
and the development and purpose of fee-shifting statutes all explain
the approach I take in the next section of this Note addressing the
circuit split.  The history of FRAP 7 and Supreme Court precedent
suggest that the D.C. and Third Circuit approaches—denying inclu-
sion of attorney fees in FRAP 7 bonds—are incorrect, as these circuits
read FRAP 7’s provisions too narrowly.  The high level of affirmance
on appeal, the purpose of fee-shifting statutes, and Supreme Court
precedent suggest that the other circuits’ approaches—allowing but
not requiring FRAP 7 bonds to include attorney fees—are incorrect as
115 See Krent, supra note 101, at 2044 (“Congress might adopt one-way fee shifting de- R
vices, whether automatic or based on the opposing party’s fault, to minimize the cost of
monitoring executive branch behavior.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney
Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 678 (1982) (“[P]laintiffs vindicate
polic[ies] that Congress considered of the highest priority.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
116 See Krent, supra note 101, at 2050 (“In particular, public interest groups benefit R
from fee shifting because, when little material recovery is possible, there rarely is sufficient
incentive for any one plaintiff to expend its own resources on behalf of the public.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
117 See id. at 2044–45 (“Congress, through fee shifting, may wish to ensure more com-
plete compensation for parties injured by government wrongdoing or by the failure of
private entities to comply with governmental directives.”).
118 See id. at 2044 (“[P]aying attorney fees may prompt agency officials to think twice
before denying a meritorious claim or pursuing a questionable enforcement action.”).
119 See Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Simply
stated, an appellant is less likely to bring a frivolous appeal if he is required to post a sizable
bond for anticipated attorneys’ fees prior to filing the appeal.”).
120 See Krent, supra note 101, at 2050 (explaining that availability of fee recovery in- R
creases incentive for litigation by plaintiffs without a “well-stocked war chest”); Vargo, supra
note 71, at 1629 (“Thus, the large number of fee-shifting statutes in the United States R
reflects neither criticism of the American Rule nor favor for the English Rule; instead, it
reflects a desire to provide additional access to the courts.”).
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they may frustrate Congress’s purposes in enacting such fee-shifting
statutes.
III
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND A BETTER APPROACH
Although the Supreme Court and academic literature has not ad-
dressed in-depth the circuit split regarding FRAP 7, lower courts con-
tinue to note and discuss whether attorney fees may appear in FRAP 7
bonds.121  Additionally, litigants continue to refer to the circuit split
when briefing FRAP 7 arguments.122  Despite receiving some attention
from lower courts and litigants, the circuit split does not create much
uncertainty or controversy in practice, as the law on FRAP 7 appears
relatively settled.123  However, the circuit split offers the Supreme
Court the opportunity to expand FRAP 7 to include attorney fees as a
matter of course and, thereby, protect appellees from the burden-
some costs of appeal.
A. The D.C. and Third Circuit Approaches: No Attorney Fees
1. The Cases: American President Lines and Hirschensohn
In 1985, the D.C. Circuit decided In re American President Lines,
Inc.,124 becoming the first federal court of appeals to address whether
FRAP 7 bonds may include attorney fees.125  The court concluded that
FRAP 7 bonds could not include attorney fees because FRAP 39’s list
of taxable costs defined FRAP 7 “costs on appeal” and did not include
attorney fees.126
American President Lines dealt with American President Lines,
Inc.’s (APL) bankruptcy proceeding.127  A debtor, Marshall P. Safir,
petitioned the bankruptcy court to enjoin APL from selling “ships,
121 See, e.g., Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Hou., 732 F.3d 479, 489 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013)
(noting the circuit split and assuming, but not deciding, that FRAP 7 may include attorney
fees).
122 See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant Sikora Nelson at 5–6, Tennille v. W. Union Co.,
No. 13–1378 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 2013) (incidentally noting circuit split in arguing that the
bond at issue should not include attorney fees or delay expenses); Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Appeal Bond at 4–5, Saltzman v.
Pella Corp., No. 1:06–CV–04481 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2013), ECF No. 395 (noting that some
circuits allow attorney fees based on underlying statute).
123 See infra Part III.B.
124 779 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
125 See id. at 716–17.  The D.C. Circuit cited to precedent throughout its decision, but
the precedent dealt with other statutory bases for awarding “costs,” not FRAP 7 specifically.
See id. at 716 n.17.
126 See id. at 716.
127 See id. at 715.
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stock, and other assets.”128  Safir and APL had a long, contentious his-
tory prior to APL’s bankruptcy.  Beginning in 1965, nearly twenty
years before APL’s bankruptcy, Safir sued APL and other companies
for damages arising from alleged unfair trade practices.129  Safir
claimed APL could not dispose of certain assets during bankruptcy
because doing so would preclude Safir from recovering his “immi-
nent” judgment.130
Safir’s confidence was misplaced.  Throughout the twenty years of
litigation, courts gave Safir’s claims very little credence.131  In fact, the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that Safir failed to persuade any court that
he held even a “cognizable claim” against APL.132  Further, the court
noted that Safir repeatedly abused the litigation process to expose
APL to twenty years of “irresponsible” and “frivolous” litigation caus-
ing APL undue delay and expense.133
In the instant bankruptcy proceedings, the D.C. Bankruptcy and
District Courts each ruled in APL’s favor and ordered Safir to pay
APL’s attorney fees—$14,000 and $10,000 respectively.134  The district
court ordered Safir to post a $10,000 FRAP 7 bond because Safir’s
appeal appeared to be frivolous.135  Despite the lower courts’ rulings
and Safir’s abusive litigation practices, the D.C. Circuit refused to in-
clude attorney fees in Safir’s FRAP 7 bond.136
The D.C. Circuit assessed FRAP 39’s “costs” definitions, con-
cluded that FRAP 39 did not include attorney fees, and applied FRAP
39’s limited costs definition to FRAP 7.137  As a result, Safir only
needed to post a bond of $450, rather than $10,000.138  The court
reasoned that district courts might “impermissibly encumber” the
right to appeal by requiring an “excessive bond” as a “precondition to
an appeal.”139
128 See In re Am. President Lines, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1307, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reciting
the procedural history of the same dispute at issue in the first American President Lines case
in 1985).
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See id. (noting that courts had never even “hinted” at Safir recovering a large
judgment).
132 Id. at 1308–09.
133 See id. at 1309–10 (“Safir’s propensity to relitigate the same issues over and over is
without parallel.”).
134 See In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 715–16 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  The
bankruptcy court simply ordered Safir to pay APL’s attorney fees, while the district court
included the fees in its FRAP 7 bond. Id.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 716.
137 Id. at 716–17.
138 Id. at 718–19.
139 Id. at 717–18.
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In reality, the court rewarded Safir’s unremitting, and admittedly
frivolous, litigation strategy.  The court reduced the FRAP 7 bond by
over 95% in a case that the court acknowledged to be frivolous.  How-
ever, the court left APL in the lurch.  APL remained unprotected with
respect to appellate attorney fees.  Practically, these costs could never
be recouped, as Safir refused to pay the costs imposed by the lower
courts and would later become insolvent.140
Over a decade after American President Lines, the Third Circuit ad-
dressed FRAP 7 in Hirschensohn v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.141  In
Hirschensohn, the plaintiff-appellant, Michael Hirschensohn, pur-
chased a title insurance policy for property situated in the Virgin
Islands from the defendant-appellee, Lawyers Title Insurance Com-
pany (Lawyers Title).142  Lawyers Title required Hirschensohn to pro-
vide a $17,000 security on the policy because the property carried a
$28,000 lien.143  Lawyers Title then used the security to clear the lien
and sued Hirschensohn for reimbursement, prompting Hirschensohn
to countersue Lawyers Title for fraud.144
After dismissing Hirschensohn’s claim for failure to satisfy diver-
sity jurisdiction, the District Court of the Virgin Islands required
Hirschensohn to post a $7,250 FRAP 7 bond prior to appeal.145
Hirschensohn never paid the $7,250 bond, which included Lawyers
Title’s expected attorney fees on appeal.146  Lawyers Title moved to
dismiss the appeal because Hirschensohn failed to pay the FRAP 7
bond.147  Upon hearing the appeal, the Third Circuit considered only
whether anticipated appellate attorney fees, which were available
under Virgin Islands law, fell within the “costs on appeal” of FRAP
7.148
The Third Circuit held that FRAP 7 bonds could not include ex-
pected appellate attorney fees.149  Similar to the D.C. Circuit in Ameri-
can President Lines, the Third Circuit concluded that Rule 39’s limited
cost definition governed FRAP 7’s “costs” on appeal.150  Unlike the
140 See In re Am. President Lines, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1307, 1310 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting
Safir claimed to be “penniless and unemployed” and had not satisfied any judgments
against him).
141 No. 96–7312, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13793, at *3 (3d Cir. June 10, 1997).
142 Id. at *2.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at *2–3.
146 Id. at *3.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at *7.
150 Id. at *3.
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D.C. Circuit, however, the Third Circuit also explained why FRAP 39
“costs” could not include attorney fees.151
The court relied on Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,152 a case in
which the Supreme Court recognized 28 U.S.C. § 1920 as the origin of
FRAP 39’s cost definition.153  The Third Circuit noted that the Road-
way Express Court assessed the “contemporaneous understanding” of
the term costs as used in § 1920 in light of the traditional “American
rule” governing attorney fees.154  Because the American rule generally
disfavors shifting attorney fees, and Congress did not indicate devia-
tion from the American rule, the Roadway Express Court refused to
expand “costs” absent an express modification by Congress.155
Additionally, the Third Circuit rejected a comparison to Marek v.
Chesny,156 in which the Supreme Court held that FRCP 68 “costs” in-
clude attorney fees.157  The Third Circuit distinguished Marek on the
basis that FRCP 68 does not attempt to define “costs” at all, while
FRAP 39 includes a list of taxable costs.158
2. The Criticism: American President Lines and Hirschensohn
The courts in American President Lines and Hirschensohn each make
several mistakes worthy of criticism.  A common theme of criticism for
both is the tendency with which the courts read FRAP 7 provisions
narrowly.
First, the Hirschensohn court relied on the American rule to argue
that allowing shifted attorney fees in a FRAP 7 bond would be some-
how unusual.159  However, Marek makes clear that Congress was aware
of the many exceptions to the American rule when Congress drafted
FRAP 7.160  As a result, Congress intended the term “costs” to at least
be informed by the statute underlying the litigation, which would
likely be far more expansive than the limited list in FRAP 39.
Second, Hirschensohn distinguished Marek on the basis that FRCP
68 does not attempt to discretely define costs.161  However, in arguing
that FRAP 39’s costs definition governs the entire FRAP—including
151 Id. at *3–4.
152 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
153 See id. at 760–61.
154 Hirschensohn, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13793, at *5 (quoting Roadway Express, 447 U.S.
at 759).
155 Id. at *4–5 (quoting Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 760–61).
156 See id. at *6 (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)).
157 Marek, 473 U.S. at 11–12.
158 See Hirschensohn, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13793, at *6.
159 See id. at *5.
160 Congress adopted FRAP 7 on July 1, 1968. See supra note 54 and accompanying R
text. Marek gives several examples of statutes in which Congress made exceptions to the
American rule before that date. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 8–9.
161 See Hirschensohn, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13973, at *6.
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FRAP 7—the courts ignore a similar defining rule in FRCP 54(d).
Thus, it is logically inconsistent to find that FRAP 39’s cost definition
transfuses through the rest of the FRAP, while FRCP 54(d) has no
effect on FRCP 68.162
Finally, the court in American President Lines worried that FRAP 7
bonds with potentially large attorney fees will impermissibly burden
the right to appeal.163  However, this ignores the practical reality that
most appeals fail—nearly eighty percent.164  Further, it ignores
Supreme Court precedent in Bradley v. Richmond School Board, which
provided that courts should protect appellees from losses—including
attorney fees—even before final disposition at the district court
level.165  If a district court may provide a party with protection even
before final disposition, it would be incongruous to deny such protec-
tion after final disposition.
B. The First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuit Approaches: Sometimes Attorney Fees
Only a year after Hirschensohn, in 1998, the other circuits started
to diverge from the Third and D.C. Circuits on FRAP 7.  Beginning
with the 1998 Second Circuit decision in Adsani166 and extending
through the 2011 First Circuit decision in International Floor Crafts,167
these circuits have taken a more expansive view of FRAP 7’s content.
Because these circuits took roughly similar approaches to FRAP 7, I
will explain Adsani relatively in depth—as it is the first case in this
line—and explain the other circuits’ incremental contributions more
cursorily.
1. The Cases: Adsani Through International Floor Crafts
In Adsani, the Second Circuit addressed a copyright infringement
dispute between a resident of the United Kingdom, Friederike Adsani,
and her literary agent, her book publisher, and others (Defend-
ants).168  After granting summary judgment for the Defendants be-
cause Adsani’s claim was “objectively unreasonable,” the District Court
for the Southern District of New York required Adsani to pay
162 See Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that FRAP 39 did not
mean FRAP 7 had a “preexisting definition of costs” any more than FRCP 54(d) meant that
FRCP 68 had such a preexisting definition).
163 See In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
164 See Clermont, supra note 7, at 1970–72 (finding that appellate courts agree with R
courts in nearly eighty percent of cases).
165 See 416 U.S. 696, 723–24 (1974) (“To delay a fee award until the entire litigation is
concluded would work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their counsel . . . .”).
166 139 F.3d 67.
167 Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420 F. App’x 6 (1st Cir. 2011).
168 See 139 F.3d at 69.
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$107,993.39 in attorney fees, pursuant to the Copyright Act.169  Be-
cause Adsani had “no assets in the United States,” the district court
required her to post a $35,000 FRAP 7 bond securing the Defendants’
costs on appeal and a “possible award of attorney’s fees.”170
The Second Circuit upheld the bond, concluding that FRAP 39’s
cost definition did not limit FRAP 7’s costs on appeal.171  Instead, con-
sistent with Supreme Court precedent in Marek, the court held that
FRAP 7 “costs on appeal” include “all costs properly awardable under
the relevant substantive statute.”172  In Marek, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that Congress was aware of the many exceptions to the Ameri-
can rule when Congress drafted FRCP 68, so Congress intentionally
left FRCP 68 “costs” undefined, leaving the courts to find meaning in
the underlying statute.173  In the instant case, the Copyright Act pro-
vided for attorney fees for victorious parties, the Copyright Act specifi-
cally entitled the appellee to attorney fees, and the district court
already granted attorney fees to Defendants, so including attorney
fees in the FRAP 7 bond would be proper.174  Given the court’s expan-
sive reading of FRAP 7, the discussion which followed the ruling on
the relationship between FRAP 39 and FRAP 7 comes as a slight
surprise.
Adsani further argued that the FRAP 7 bond constituted an “im-
permissible barrier to appeal.”175  The court acknowledged that the
Government may limit the right to appeal “by statute requiring . . . the
posting of security for ‘expenses, including counsel fees, which may be
incurred’ on appeal.”176  However, such a security must be “reasona-
bly tailored to [preserve an award already made or protect appellees
from loss on appeal] and uniformly and nondiscriminatorily ap-
plied.”177  In Adsani, the FRAP 7 bond did not impermissibly burden
169 Id. at 70.
170 Id. (citation omitted).
171 See id. at 74–75.
172 See id. at 72 (citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).  In Marek, the
Supreme Court held that FRCP 68 could include attorney fees as “costs” even though
FRCP 54(d) defined “costs” without reference to attorney fees. See id. at 74.  Similarly,
here, the Second Circuit held that FRAP 39’s definition of “costs” should not define “costs”
for the entire FRAP. Id. at 74–75.
173 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 8–9.
174 See Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75.  The court also rejected Adsani’s argument that FRAP 7’s
legislative history—originally requiring only a $250 bond—implicitly precluded attorney
fees, reasoning that $250 in 1937 might well reflect flexibility in the rule to cover attorney
fees. See id. at 75–76.  The court reasoned that $250 would be higher than regular adminis-
trative costs for an appeal when Congress enacted FRCP 73(c)—FRAP 7’s predecessor—so
Adsani’s argument, although plausible, was “equivocal at best.” See id. at 76.
175 Id. at 76.
176 Id. at 77 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 551–52 (1949)).
177 See id. at 78 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972)).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN405.txt unknown Seq: 23 27-APR-15 12:50
2015] PROTECTING WINNERS 975
Adsani’s right to appeal because the district court did not impose the
bond automatically, and the bond was not a “double bond.”178
Although the Adsani court asserted that an automatic bond would
be discriminatory, it does not explain why such a bond is discrimina-
tory.  In fact, the Adsani court merely cites Lindsey for the proposition
that FRAP 7 bonds “should never be automatically assessed because
this will undoubtedly discriminate against those litigants who cannot
afford to post a bond” and moves on.179  However, the Adsani court
gives short shrift to Lindsey’s reasoning.  Rather than prohibiting all
automatically imposed bonds, Lindsey more accurately prohibits only
automatically imposing a bond that is not “reasonably tailored” to pro-
tecting an appellee on appeal.180  In Lindsey, although the court auto-
matically imposed the bond for twice the plaintiff’s rental value, the
bond fell because it bore no reasonable relationship to the landlord’s
potential costs or losses on appeal rather than because the court im-
posed the bond automatically.181  As a result, courts should not balk at
automatically—albeit tentatively—assessing an FRAP 7 bond as long as
the court reasonably tailors the bond to protecting the appellee from
losses on appeal.
Four years after Adsani, the Eleventh Circuit similarly held that
FRAP 7 bonds may include attorney fees in Pedraza v. United Guaranty
Corp.182  Although the Eleventh Circuit largely adopted Adsani’s rea-
soning regarding Marek and Congress’s awareness of fee-shifting stat-
utes when drafting FRAP 7,183 the court introduced a few
considerations relevant to FRAP 7 bonds.
First, the court acknowledged that fee-shifting statutes’ underly-
ing purposes—to ensure effective prosecution of meritorious claims
and protect defendants from meritless appeals184—align with the pur-
poses of FRAP 7 bonds—to protect the rights of appellees.185  The
court further stated that district courts may further these purposes by
requiring that shiftable attorney fees be available “ab initio.”186  How-
ever, the court maintained that regardless of how FRAP 7 bonds affect
178 See id.  A “double bond” refers to a bond similar to the bond in Lindsey, where the
court required a property lessee to post a bond of twice the property’s rental value. See
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 77.  The Court struck down the bond in Lindsey because it bore no
reasonable relationship to the award already granted or the potential costs on appeal. See
id. at 78–79.
179 See Adsani, 139 F.3d at 78 (citing Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 79).
180 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 77–79 (reasoning that a plaintiff could still pay their rent
during their appeals, so automatically assessing this double-rental-value bond served only
to bar plaintiffs from appeal).
181 See id.
182 313 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002).
183 See id. at 1329–30.
184 See id. at 1332.
185 See id. at 1333.
186 Id.
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appeals, the courts of appeals can dismiss frivolous claims at the out-
set, thereby saving appellees from significant expense.187
Second, the court took a relatively restrictive view of whether the
underlying statute would authorize attorney fees in FRAP 7 bonds.
The Pedraza court dealt with the Real Estate Settlement Procedure
Act’s (RESPA) fee-shifting provision, which stated, “the court may
award to the prevailing party the court costs of the action together with
reasonable attorneys fees.”188  Unlike RESPA, the statutes at issue in
Adsani and Marek provided that “the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs.”189  The court reasoned that Congress distinguished between
“costs” and “attorney fees” in RESPA by eschewing the language found
in the Copyright and Civil Rights Acts.190  As a result, the court de-
cided to treat the two separately for FRAP 7 purposes.  Thus, despite
endorsing a broad purpose and interpretation of FRAP 7 “costs on
appeal” earlier in the opinion, the court narrowed FRAP 7’s applica-
tion by seizing on this textual distinction to reject an FRAP 7 bond
including attorney fees.191
Following Pedraza, in 2004, the Sixth Circuit addressed FRAP 7
bonds for the first time in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.192  In
Cardizem, Eugenia Sams—a class member in a nationwide antitrust
class action suit—objected to and appealed from a district court order
approving a preliminary settlement.193  In December 2003, Sams also
appealed a district court order assessing a FRAP 7 bond against her,
which included $50,000 in projected attorney fees.194  The plaintiffs
moved for an expedited appeal, but the court still did not reach its
decision for over a year—issuing its opinion on December 14, 2004.195
Following the reasoning in Adsani and Pedraza, the Sixth Circuit held
that FRAP 7 bonds could include attorney fees if the statute underly-
ing the plaintiff’s action made attorney fees available to a victorious
party.196
187 See id. at 1333 n.14.
188 Id. at 1333–34 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5) (2012)).
189 See id. at 1333 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012)).
190 See id. at 1333–34.
191 See id. at 1333–35.
192 See 391 F.3d 812, 815–16 (6th Cir. 2004).
193 See id. at 814–15.  Although the instant case only involves one of Sams’s appeals, the
district court, the Tennessee attorney general, and the Judicial Multidistrict Panel on Liti-
gation all rejected Sams’s theories and arguments on several occasions.  See id.
194 See id. at 815.
195 See id. at 812, 815 n.2.
196 See id. at 817–18 (“Accordingly, under the underlying statute, not only was the dis-
trict court entitled to include in the bond amount attorney’s fees, but it was entitled to
include any other damages incurred, presumably including administrative costs.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN405.txt unknown Seq: 25 27-APR-15 12:50
2015] PROTECTING WINNERS 977
Despite largely reproducing the reasoning from prior FRAP 7
cases, the Cardizem court altered FRAP 7 doctrine in two important
ways.  First, Cardizem expanded the FRAP 7 “costs on appeal” to en-
compass costs enumerated in an underlying state statute, whereas each
previous FRAP 7 case dealt with federal statutes.197  While not analyti-
cally significant, this expansion is consistent with the broad approach
Congress intended for FRAP 7.  Second, Cardizem expanded the
Pedraza court’s narrow interpretive technique when deciding whether
Tennessee’s statute authorized attorney fees in a FRAP 7 bond.  The
language of the Tennessee statute before the court in Cardizem stated,
“the court may require the person instituting the action to indemnify
the defendant for any damages incurred, including reasonable attor-
ney’s fees and costs.”198  Similar to the statutes in Marek and Pedraza,
the Tennessee statute clearly distinguished between “costs” and attor-
ney fees, albeit including them under the umbrella term “damages.”
Despite this linguistic similarity, the Sixth Circuit correctly interpreted
the Tennessee statute more broadly.  The court reasoned that Marek
did not require the underlying statute to provide a “definition” of
costs, but rather the statute only needed to assist the court in defining
the term.199  Accordingly, the court only assessed whether “the under-
lying statute was sufficient to inform the definition of ‘costs’” under
FRAP 7.200  Although the state legislature had distinguished the terms
“costs” and “attorney fees,” the court concluded the statute was “suffi-
cient to inform” FRAP 7’s cost definition.201
In addition, the Cardizem court considered whether to dismiss
Sams’s appeal for her failure to post the FRAP 7 bond and succinctly
stated the factors governing such a dismissal.202  The court considered
three factors: prejudice to other parties, justification for failing to post
the bond, and the merits of the underlying appeal.203  The court dis-
missed Sams’s appeal for failure to post the FRAP 7 bond because her
appeal would prejudice the other class members and defendants
through added expense and delay, her appeal offered no justification
for failing to pay the bond, and her appeal simply “lack[ed] merit.”204
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit entered the fray with Azizian v. Feder-
ated Department Stores, Inc.205  In Azizian, certain class members—in-
cluding Kamela Wilkinson—objected to a proposed class action
197 Cardizem involved section 47–18–109 of the Tennessee Code. See id. at 817.
198 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47–18–109(e)(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
199 See Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 817 n.4.
200 See id. at 818 (emphasis added).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 499 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2007).
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settlement in an antitrust suit arising under the Clayton Act.206  The
nonobjecting class members moved to require the objectors to post a
FRAP 7 bond, including $300,000 in appellate attorney fees and
$6,540 in administration costs; the court ordered Wilkinson to post a
FRAP 7 bond including $40,000 in appellate attorney fees and $2,000
in administrative costs.207  Wilkinson appealed the district court’s
bond order and attempted to tender a FRAP 7 bond of $2,000, but
never paid the full bond of $42,000.208  Although the District Court
for the Northern District of California approved the settlement on
March 30, 2005, the Ninth Circuit did not even rule on the FRAP 7
bond, which predates an appeal on the merits, until August 23,
2007—a delay of over two-and-a-half years.209  When the court did
rule, however, it found that FRAP 7 bonds could include attorney fees,
but the class-member appellees here were not entitled to attorney
fees.210
The Azizian court held that FRAP 7 bonds could include attorney
fees if the underlying statute had such a provision for four reasons.211
First, Congress did not define “costs on appeal” in FRAP 7, so they
intended to incorporate the “cost” definition from underlying stat-
utes.212  Second, Congress did not indicate that FRAP 39 creates a
blanket definition of “costs” for the FRAP.213  Third, including attor-
ney fees in the FRAP 7 bond most effectively gives meaning to each
word of the underlying fee-shifting statutes.214  Finally, such a defini-
tion best comports with FRAP 7’s purpose to tax the full range of costs
on appeal.215
The Azizian court, however, refused to approve the bond as ap-
plied against Wilkinson because including attorney fees would not fur-
ther the purposes of the Clayton Act’s fee-shifting provision.216  As a
one-way fee-shifting statute, section 4 of the Clayton Act217 served to
encourage private enforcement of antitrust laws and deter antitrust
206 See id. at 954.  Interestingly, the nonobjecting plaintiffs originally requested over
$300,000 for appellate attorney fees. Id.
207 Id.
208 See id.
209 See id. at 950, 954 (discussing the case’s prior proceedings).
210 See id. at 958–59.
211 See id.
212 See id. at 958 (relying on Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)).
213 See id.
214 See id. at 959.  The court does not address whether the Cardizem court furthered this
same purpose when it interpreted the Tennessee statute in that case according to a “suffi-
cient to inform” standard.
215 See id.
216 See id. at 959–60.
217 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).  The statute states, “any person who shall be injured . . .
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover . . . the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Id.
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violations by defendants.218  Here, Wilkinson was a coplaintiff with the
class members seeking the FRAP 7 bond.219  The class members’ suit
was not against Wilkinson—a fellow victim—so the FRAP 7 bond
would not have the effect of encouraging future, meritorious litiga-
tion against antitrust violators.  Furthermore, Wilkinson was not a de-
fendant, so she need not be deterred from future wrongdoing.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit, in Azizian, implicitly introduced
two separate assessments for a FRAP 7 bond.  First, the text of the
statute must actually authorize the appellee to recover attorney fees.
Second, the inclusion of attorney fees in the FRAP 7 bond must fur-
ther the purposes of the underlying statute.
Finally, in the 2011 case International Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit,220
the First Circuit spoke the most recent word on FRAP 7 bonds and
attorney fees.221  In its holding, the International Floor Crafts court
nicely summarized the FRAP 7 doctrine—essentially the FRAP 7 attor-
ney fee “rule,” if you will—following the previous cases.  The court
held that FRAP 7 bonds could include attorney fees if “the applicable
statute underlying the litigation contains a fee-shifting provision that
accounts for such fees in its definition of recoverable costs and the
appellee is eligible to recover them.”222  The First Circuit also ruled
on the appellant’s motion to stay the FRAP 7 bond, requiring that the
appellant show “irreparable harm,” which exceeds claims of being in
“poor financial shape.”223  The appellant in International Floor Crafts
failed to prove irreparable harm, in part, because she vowed to post
the bond if she lost the motion and did eventually post the bond.224
These cases—from Adsani through International Floor Crafts—all
allow for FRAP 7 bonds to include appellate attorney fees.  One can
summarize the basic doctrine underlying these cases in a few key prin-
ciples.  First, the underlying statute—state or federal—defines the
term “costs on appeal” for FRAP 7.  Second, the applicable statute will
define “costs on appeal” as including attorney fees either by explicitly
equating attorney fees and costs or simply by being “sufficient to
218 Azizian, 499 F.3d at 959–60.
219 Id. at 954, 960.
220 420 F. App’x 6 (1st Cir. 2011).
221 See id. at 16–19.  I use the term “most recent” to refer to the courts of appeals.
Various district courts have recently ruled on FRAP 7 bonds and acknowledged the circuit
split described here. See, e.g., Star Pac. Corp. v. Star Atl. Corp., No. 08–04957, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22644, at *4 n.3 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2013) (recognizing the circuit split on FRAP 7
in denying a bond); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., No.
01–12257–PBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 901, at *50 (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 2012) (noting that there
was no applicable fee-shifting statute in declining to include attorney fees in a FRAP 7
bond).
222 Int’l Floor Crafts, 420 F. App’x at 17 (emphasis added).
223 See id. at 19.
224 Id.
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inform” the court of “costs on appeal.”  Third, the appellee—by a
plain reading of the statute—must be entitled to recover attorney fees.
Fourth, providing the specific appellee with expected appellate attor-
ney fees in the FRAP 7 bond must further the purposes of the underly-
ing statute.  Fifth, the bond must be “reasonably tailored” to protect
the appellee on appeal, and not be a “double bond” or automatically
assessed.  Sixth, the court may dismiss for failure to post a bond if the
appeal will prejudice other parties, the appellant cannot justify the
failure to post the bond, or the merits of the appeal are lacking.  Sev-
enth, and finally, the appellant may stay a bond by showing “irrepara-
ble harm.”
2. The Criticism: Adsani Through International Floor Crafts
Largely, the aforementioned courts have reached the desirable
end result that FRAP 7 bonds may include appellate attorney fees.
Doing so protects appellees from unjustified costs and uncertainties
on appeal.  However, there are a few aspects of the doctrine and cases
that are deserving of criticism.
Adsani’s interpretation of an automatic bond’s propriety is erro-
neous.  The Supreme Court in Lindsey did not explain why an auto-
matically assessed bond would unfairly discriminate against those who
could not afford the bond; at least, not why this bond would be any
more discriminatory than a bond imposed only after a motion by the
appellee.  The reasoning is especially suspect when one considers the
fact that an appellant could avoid the automatically imposed bond by
showing irreparable harm.
Pedraza is vulnerable to two stark criticisms.  First, the court
demonstrated a blase´ attitude toward FRAP 7’s appellee-protection
function by indicating that, even absent an FRAP 7 bond, a motion to
dismiss for frivolous appeal would protect appellees from undue de-
lay.225  This ignores economic reality.  The parties would still face the
attorney costs of briefing the motion.  The parties would still face sig-
nificant time delay, as the expedited appeals on FRAP 7 bond motions
alone take at least six months.226  Significantly, the parties would still
face the uncertainty regarding whether the fees would be available, as
many of the appellants in these cases never wound up paying the
bond or fees at all.227  Seemingly, a motion for dismissal is not suffi-
ciently analogous to FRAP 7 bonds’ protections to constitute an
225 See Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1333 n.14 (11th Cir. 2002).
226 See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 812, 815 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004)
(implying that an expedited appeal would take at least six months to resolve).
227 See, e.g., Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Adsani did not oppose
enforcement of judgment for the remaining $57,993.39 in attorney’s fees nor did she make
payment on this remaining sum.”); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786
F.2d 794, 799–800 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing for alternative security instead of a bond).
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alternative to bonds.  Second, the Pedraza court read the underlying
statute far too narrowly.  FRAP 7’s terms deserve a broad reading
based on three important factors.  First, amendments to FRAP 7 ex-
panded FRAP 7 from $250 to a larger amount in the district court’s
discretion indicating a broader need for appellee protection.228  Sec-
ond, the Advisory Committee notes explained the expansive purpose
of FRAP 7 to cover the “actual costs.”229  Finally, the case of Bradley v.
Richmond School Board230 indicates that appellee protection becomes
appropriate when the district court decides parties’ substantial
rights—even prior to final disposition.231  Taken together, these three
important factors make Pedraza’s narrow reading inappropriate.
Cardizem’s legal and analytical approaches are largely unobjec-
tionable.  However, the case’s practical realities reveal a flaw in the
doctrine: the FRAP 7 bond as currently imposed is too conditional.
The Cardizem court dismissed the appeal for failure to post the FRAP 7
bond, but only after more than a year passed and the appellees in-
curred the costs of briefing motions.232  This is unfortunate for two
reasons.  First, the appellees in Cardizem had already endured several
of the appellant’s motions, each of which failed, showing that the ap-
peal was at most unlikely to win.233  Second, the affirmance rate on all
appeals in the United States is overwhelmingly high.234  Thus, al-
lowing appellees to face over a year delay when they have already won
at the district court level and will almost certainly win on appeal frus-
trates and—given the inability of many appellants to ever pay fees—
potentially undoes the appellee-protection purposes of FRAP 7.
Azizian’s main criticism lies outside the scope of this Note, deal-
ing with class-action objectors and appellate bonds.235  However, one
aspect of the court’s reasoning is squarely wrong: requiring class-ac-
tion objectors to post an appellate bond would not further a fee-shift-
ing statute’s purpose of encouraging meritorious suits.236  It is
apparent that plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel would be more willing
to bring an antitrust claim if the court would secure their appellate
attorney fees following an offered settlement.  For example, in Azizian,
the court did not decide the objector’s appeal until two-and-a-half
228 See FED. R. APP. P. 2 advisory committee’s notes (1979).
229 See id.
230 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
231 See id. at 723.
232 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 2004).
233 See id.
234 See COFFIN, supra note 48, at 97; Clermont, supra note 7, at 1970–72. R
235 For a very interesting discussion on this particular topic, see John E. Lopatka & D.
Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 865 (2012).
236 See Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2007).
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years after the district court approved the settlement.237  At least the
converse is likely true: antitrust victims and attorneys may be less likely
to bring meritorious claims if they know they could be subject to a
two-and-a-half year delay without attorney fees protection.
In summary, this line of cases largely reaches the correct result,
but tends to ignore the practical realities surrounding a case.  Given
FRAP 7’s purpose and the high rate of affirmance on appeal, allowing
FRAP 7 bond appeals to drag along for as long as two-and-a-half years
frustrates Congress’s purposes in drafting this rule at all.  Accordingly,
the Supreme Court should exploit the current circuit split to intro-
duce a better approach.
C. A Better, More Automatic Approach
A better approach to assessing FRAP 7 bonds would involve four
steps.  First, the district court should automatically assess a FRAP 7
bond following final disposition.  Although Lindsey and Adsani suggest
that automatically assessed bonds are impermissible, both cases are
relatively old.  The court should revisit this issue because an automati-
cally assessed bond can still be “reasonably tailored” to FRAP 7’s pur-
pose of protecting appellees.  Second, the district court should allow
the losing party to stay the bond only by demonstrating irreparable
harm.  Allowing the losing party this opportunity would strike a bal-
ance between the purposes of protecting an appellee and the losing
party’s right to appeal.  Offering an opportunity to avoid the bond at
the district court level reduces the burden on a party’s right to appeal
because the losing party can offer evidence regarding financial hard-
ship without facing the delay between final disposition and appeal.
Third, if the district court denies the losing party’s motion to stay, the
court of appeals should grant the losing party—and potential appel-
lant—the opportunity for an ex parte petition to the court of appeals
to demonstrate a reasonable inference of irreparable harm from post-
ing a FRAP 7 bond.  The ex parte nature of such a petition protects
appellees from the “substantial costs” of briefing the issues and poten-
tial oral argument.238  It also allows the losing party to retain some
control over the future of her case.  Finally, should the appellant
demonstrate a reasonable inference of irreparable harm, the court of
appeals should offer the appellee the opportunity to fully brief its ar-
gument regarding the appellant’s irreparable harm—with the appeal
following as per usual thereafter.  This final step protects the appel-
lee’s ability to respond to any of the appellant’s arguments in its irrep-
arable harm petition.
237 See id. at 950, 954.
238 See Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 815 n.2.
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Although this approach may burden appeal, all appellate
bonds—including FRAP 7 bonds—burden appeal to some extent;
however these bonds are still valid.239  The proper remedy for this
concern is Supreme Court review to ensure that the bonds, although
automatically imposed, are reasonably tailored to protecting individ-
ual appellees.  This approach would recognize the economic reality
that most appeals simply do not win and merely expose appellees to
added expense, thereby creating opportunity for abuse.
CONCLUSION
Imagine again that you are the numismatist—the coin collector—
from the introduction.  Imagine your decision to sue and vindicate
your rights under any of the three regimes described in the prior sec-
tion.  Under Hirschensohn and American President Lines, you have no at-
torney fees in the FRAP 7 bond.  You face absolute uncertainty about
whether the coin manufacturer can cover your appellate attorney fees
even though you already won at the district court level and have an
80% chance of winning on appeal.  Under the Adsani-International
Floor Crafts approach, you likely will have some certainty and protec-
tion regarding appellate attorney fees.  The Hobby Protection Act
treats costs and attorney fees the same, you are a victorious plaintiff
entitled to attorney fees under the act, and awarding such fees would
encourage meritorious claims in the future.  However, briefing these
issues and waiting for the court of appeals’ decision will impose costs
in money and time.  Ultimately, after paying your attorney to brief and
orally argue the issues on the coin manufacturer’s FRAP 7 bond, the
court of appeals may reject the bond, leaving you unprotected.
Under the better approach detailed above, however, you would have
certainty from the moment the district court ruled in your favor.  The
appellant would have to prove irreparable harm from posting a FRAP
7 bond including attorney fees before you would need an attorney to
do anything.
As described, the Hirschensohn and American President Lines cases
reach the entirely wrong result.  These decisions eschew FRAP 7
amendments and Supreme Court precedent by narrowly reading
FRAP 7 amendments.  Further, the Adsani-International Floor Crafts line
of cases inadequately protects appellees in light of the real-world data
regarding the high rate of affirmance on appeal.  As a result, a better
approach would retain much of the International Floor Crafts doctrine,
yet add the procedural protections described above.
239 See Int’l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420 F. App’x 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Any bond
imposed pursuant to Rule 7 burdens an appeal to some degree, yet we presume that Rule 7
is valid.”).
